INTRODUCTION
TIIE doctrine of the reflex constitution of the nervous system-the foundation of Hughlings Jackson's neurological teaching (II, 63, 399)*-has received ample recognition in the study of the more primitive activities of the organism, such as locomotion, but has, by contrast, received practically no recognitioni in the study of that most complex activity, mentation. Failure to regard the highest cerebral centres as a reflex mechanism is utterly contrary to the views of Jackson, who held that the highest centres, while more complex than the lowest, are, like the lowest, subject to the laws of reflex actioin. Thus he wrote (II, 63): ' A manl, physically regarded, is a sensorimotor mechanism. I particularlv wish to insist that the highest centres-physical basis of mind or consciousness-have this kind of constitution, that they represent innumerable different impressions and movements of all parts of the body, although very indirectly, as certainly as that the lumbar enlargement represents comparatively few of a limited region of the body nearly directly. . . . If the doctrine of evolution be true, all nervous centres must be of sensorimotor constitution. A priori, it seems reasonable to suppose that, if phenomena, yet, disclaiming any knowledge of psychiatry, he attempted only in the most fragmentary way the task of applying these laws to the study of specific mental symptoms. Therefore, while I believe the formulations offered in this paper are in accord with his views, I cannot with certainty say he would have sanctioned them, and it would be a mistake to charge him with any errors and crudities to be found in them.
In accordance with Jackson's teaching (II, 63, 72, 156, 160), a distinction will be made, throughout this paper, between mental states and nervous states. The brain is a material thing; the mind is something immaterial. During every mental state there is a concomitant nervous state. The two should be considered separately in any attempt to analyze the nature of mental processes. The study of the immaterial thing, mind, is psychology; the study of the material thing, the brain, is physiolcgy. As physicians, it is not enough that we consider mental symptoms as mental phenomena (a psychological study); we must also consider the nervous processes concomitant therewith (a physiological study).
The nervous system may be regarded as a complicated series of reflex arcs, superimposed one on the other. The lowest are the least, while the highest are the most, complex. Jackson roughly divided the central nervous -system into lowest, middle and highest centres, but he emphasized that each of these levels may be divided and subdivided into lower and higher portions, so that really the central nervous system is made up of an almost infinite number of levels. Following Jackson's terminology, I shall speak of the highest 'centres,' which are, in turn, divided into lower and higher 'layers ' (I, 380; II, 50, 56, 437, 480) .
Lower levels of the nervous system differ from higher levels in two important respects: they are less complex and more automatic.
1. Complexity.-The gradation from lowest to highest centres is a gradation from least to greatest complexity. Consider, as an example, two problems in mathematics-problem A, which can be solved by the average man, and problem B, which can be solved only by the most eminent mathematicians. Obviously B is more complex than A. Moreover, the nervous substrate utilized in comprehending and solving B is more complex than that for A. When an eminent mathematician is in process of solving B, the very highest layers of his highest centres are engaged; when he is solving A, the layers engaged are in some degree lower.
2. Automaticity.-The gradation from lowest to highest centres is also a gradation from most to least automatic (II, 46, 53, 68) . A reflex arc may be termed automatic to the extent that it functions stably under a variety of conditions, without requiring the attention of the subject. Thus the reflex arcs engaged during walking are more automatic than those engaged during the solving of a difficult mathematical problem: one can walk without attending to it, but one cannot solve a difficult problem without giving it one's closest attention.
The nervous system, then, may be regarded as an elaborate structure of reflex arcs, varying (as we proceed from below upward) from the least complex and most automatic to the most complex and least automatic.
In studying examples of mentation, one must consider not only a particular mental act but also the situation which evokes it. In the following example I shall consider two situations which evoke a response eonsisting of the utterance ' Good morning.' (a) On the one hand, one may meet a friend, and, returning the friend's greeting, may say ' Good morning.' (b) On the other hand, one may be conversing with a foreign acquaintance who is trying to learn English; the foreigner may ask, 'What do people say as they greet each other in the morning ? ' and the reply will be 'Good morning. ' The utterance in (a) is the same as in (b), and one might be tempted to say that the nervous pathways engaged in both cases are the same. Actuall-y this is only partially true. Both utterances are responses to stimuli, and since the stimuli in (a) and (b) are different, the reflex arcs engaged cannot be identical. The two reflex arcs coincide only in so far as they have a 'final common path.' The difference in the two arcs may be stated thus: the are engaged in (a) is more automatic than in (b). Saying 'Good morning' in response to a greeting is a highly automatic act: one may say it even when one is deeply absorbed. On the other hand, saying it in reply to the foreigner's query is less automatic, since some degree of attention is required. Here, then, we have two reflex arcs, one slightly, the other highly, automatic, sharing a final common path. (This viewpoint is further discussed in the next section.)
Considering further the last example, it is conceivable that a lesion of the highest layers of the highest centres might extend downward just far enough to interrupt the reflex arc utilized in (b) without interrupting that utilized in (a) . In such a case the patient would be unable to reply 'Good morning ' to the foreigner's query, but would be able to say it in response to a greeting. There would, in other words, be loss of the more complex utterance of' Good morning,' together with retention of its more automatic utterance.
Such 'selective ' loss of function may seem incredible, but really is not. In the next section I shall give actual instances of this type of loss.
The following proposition, then, is the keynote of this paper: paralysis of the highest layers of the highest centres may produce loss of the least automatic (most complex) mental functions, while leaving unimpaired those mental functions which are more automatic (less complex). This retention of more automatic function is what Jackson implied by his phrase ' reduction to a more automatic condition.' How can one distinguish the more automatic and the less automatic activities of the organism ? One criterion I have already alluded to: a function is automatic in the degree in which it may be exercised without the subject's attention. The only other criterion to which I shall here refer relates to priority of appearance in the ontogeny of the organism. Those functions which appear first become the most automatic-a proposition in keeping with the fact that, speaking generally, the nervous system develops from the bottom up. Children can walk long before they can solve problems in geometry. This means that there is a stage at which the substrate of walking is fully evolved, while the substrate for the solving of problems in geometry is not. Anatomically, the lattei substate occupies a higher level than the former. A lesion of the highest centres migiht interrupt the latter and not the former, in which case there would be loss of the more complex function, mathematical reasoning, and retention of the more automatic function, walking.
It should be noted that I do not say that in all cases of nervous disease there is loss of the most complex functions and retention of the most automatic. I say this is true only of those cases where the dissolution is froni the top downward. It is not true of cases where the lesion is confined to parts below the top. Thus, a patient with tabes and with intact highest centres will show impairment of some of his more automatic functions, such as walking, but no impairment of his complex functions, such as the ability to solve problems in geometry. This combination of phenomena would never oecur in cases of disease of the highest centres.
Before proceeding, the terminology to be used in this paper will be further defined. 2. The adjectives 'automatic' and 'complex' will be applied both to functions and their substrates. Thus, comparing the functions walking and thinking, we may say that the former is the more automatic (or the less complex); we may say the same of their respective substrates.
3. Functions and their substrates are automatic only in a relative sense. Thus it means nothing to say that walking is an automatic function. Walking is more automatic than abstract thinking, since it appears earlier in life. On the other hand, walking is less automatic than grasping, since the former appears at the age of one year while the latter is present at birth. The relativity of the concept 'automatic' may be compared with that of the concepts 'tall 'and ' short.' For the sake of convenience some men are called tall and others short, but really every man has some degree of tallness. A dwarf measuring 2 feet in height has 2 feet of tallness. When Normally the pupil reacts to light and on accommodation. It would be absurd to say that since in both instances the result is the same-pupillary contraction-the pathways engaged in both must be the same. In reality, there are two pathways, one activated when the eye is exposed to light, the other when the eyes are accommodated for near vision. The two pathways coincide only in so far as they possess a final common path, which probably originates in the oculomotor nucleus. No one thinks it strange that there are cases in -which the light reflex is lost while the accommodation reflex is retained. In such cases everyone accepts the inevitable conclusion that there is interruption of the substrate of the light reflex but not of the accommodation reflex. The point of interruption of the substrate of the light reflex must be somewhere above the origin of the final common path which the two substrates have in common. When, on the other hand, there is interruption of the final common path, the pupil is irresponsive not only to light but also on accommodation. The contraction of the pupil may be compared with the utterance 'No.' There are innumerable situations which cause one to say 'No.' There are, in other words, innumerable reflexes whose common response consists of the utterance 'No.' Correspondingly, there are innumerable nervous substrates (reflex arcs) possessing a final common path.
When there is interruption of this final common path, inability to say 'No' is complete, in the sense that under no circumstances can the patient say it.
When, on the other hand, there is interruption of some of the substrates above the point of origin of the final common path, there is selective loss of the ability to say 'No': the patient can say it under some circumstances but not under others, just as in the Argyll Robertson pupil there is pupillary constriction on accommodation but not on exposure to light. In two cases of delirium I have observed a phenomenon identical in principle with this selective loss of the ability to say 'No.' In these two cases the patient, being disoriented, failed to answer correctly when asked to name my vocation, in spite of thefact that during the conversation just before the question he had spontaneously addressed me as 'Doctor.' In one case (delirium in a chronic drinker with pulmonary tuberculosis and moderate fever), the patient, as I walked into his room at the Harrisburg State Hospital, said, ' Good morning, Doctor.' After a bit of casual conversation I questioned him as to his surroundings and found him disoriented; he thought the place was a factory in a small town near Harrisburg. Thus far in this section only verbal acts (utterances) have been considered. Similar remarks may be made about non-verbal acts, such as movements of the face, tongue and limbs. There have been cases in which the patient lost the ability to perform a particular act voluntarily but was still able to do so automatically. Jackson (II, 153) alluded to ani aphasic patient who could not protrude the tongue when asked to do so, yet protruded it after drinking, when, as was her custom, she licked her lips. Patients with hysterical astasia-abasia may be unable to walk in ordinary situations, yet may be able to run perfectly in escaping from danlger. In a fiction magazine I have read of an Italian soldier in the World War who, after a trifling injury, became completely paralyzed. The physician, suspecting hysteria, drew his gun and, in the patient's hearing, said it was a pity that the government in the interests of economy had decreed that all chronic invalids must be shot. As the physician aimed the gun, the patient leaped off the stretcher and ran away screaming with terror. The story was reported as having really occurred. I cannot vouch for its authenticity, but physiologically it is credible. If a fire broke out in a neurological ward, no one would be surprised to hear that hysterical paralytics ran to safety. Cases of this sort, in which a helpless paralytic is able to run in an urgent situation, have led some physicians to conclude that in hysteria there is ' nothing really wrong with the brain.' This untenable conclusion is based on the erroneouks belief that there is only one substrate of locomotion. In reality (if we consider not merely the physical movements of locomotion but also the situations which evoke it), there are as many substrates as there are situations capable of evoking a locomotor response. These substrates converge in a final common path, but before converging they occupy varying levels in the central nervous system, the level depending on the degree of automaticity of the locomotor response in a particular situation. In situations of peril, locomotion is a highly automatic function; in the ordinary situations of life, it is a more voluntary function; during a physical examination, when a person walks in response to the physician's command, it is even more voluntary.
A patient's ability to run from a fire when in ordinary situations he is helpless by no means signifies that there is nothing wrong with his brain. It does not even signify that there is nothing wiong with the substrate of locomotion. All it signifies is that there is nothing wrong with the substrates of automatic locomotion, the pathological process affecting only the substrates of voluintary locomotion. The pathological process, in other words, is high rather than low in the central ncrvous system.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE HIGHEST CENTRES; THEIR ACHIEVEMENT OF INDEPENDENCE OF LOWER CENTRES; LOSS OF THIS INDEPENDENCE THROUGH DISEASE
This section is a continuation of certain parts of the discussion contained in my recent paper 5 on the psychiatric importance of Jackson's theories. In order briefly to summarize the pertinent parts of that paper, I shall refer to certain aspects of the role of the highest centres in mentation.
In discussing the physical processes concomitant with imagery, Jackson used the terms 'vivid image ' (e.g. when one actually sees an object) and 'faint image ' (when one merely thinks of, or visualizes, that object).
When one actually sees an object, the physical process, according to Jackson (II, 69), is as follows:
' I suppose that I am seeing a brick. . . . What first happens is that there is a peripheral impression (upon the retina), impulses then pass through the lowest, through the middle, and up to the highest sensory centres. ... So far we have only stated one half of the reflex action, have only reached the physical condition in the highest sensory centres correlative with the colour of the brick. It and all other objects have shape, and this as much requires to be accounted for as the colour. The shape of an object is the relation of its several positions one to another; our knowledge of this relation is by movements, in this case ocular movements. . . . By currents passing from the highest sensory centres, so to speak, " across " to the highest motor centres, and from these downward, through middle and lowest motor centres to muscular periphery, there is development of movements cf the eyeballs. . . . Here we have . . . reflex action. ' When one thinks of a brick, the reflex action is confined to the highest centres (II, 70): ' The highest sensory and motor centres are alone engaged; there is still reflex action, but only the central links of the great sensorimotor chain arc engaged; the central part only of the whole process which occurred in perception is done over again, and, the excitations being slight, the image arising is faint, and, the lower centres not being engaged, it is feebly and indefinitely projected, seems more part of ourselves.' Assuming Jackson's views to be correct, we may say that the 'substrate of the faint image " brick " ' (the substrate activated when one thinks of a brick) lies in the highest centres; it forms a component (the central or topmost component) of the 'substrate of the vivid image " brick." ' Turning from imagery to movement, we find a similar distinction between a movement actually made and one merely thought of. Quoting Jackson (II, 95, footnote): ' When I actually move my arm . . . there is a process from highest motor centres, through lower centres, then by nerves to some muscles, which are discharged in a particular way. This is a purely physical process. ... When we think of the movement, or remember it (popularly "have an idea of it "), the physical process is limited to the highest centres; the very same nervous arrangements of these centres are engaged, but they are slightly engaged, and the psychical state concomitant with the slighter process is faint ' (italics in original).
According to Jackson, then, the substrate of an 'idea of a movement' lies in the highest centres; it forms the central or topmost component of the substrate of the actual movement.
In this paper I shall more particularly be concerned with a special instance of movement-speech. In saying a word, e.g. 'tree,' one makes certain movements of respiratory and articulatory muscles. The nervous substrate activated when one says the word may be termed the ' substrate of the spoken word " tree." ' On the other hand, one may think of the word without saying it. The mental state now is a special instance of that which *one has when one thinks of any movement; it is an 'idea of a movement.' There is, concomitantly, activation of what may be called the 'substrate of the unspoken word " tree." ' The substrate of an unspoken word bears the same relation to that of the spoken word as the substrate of an ' idea of a movement ' bears to that of the actual movernent.
Jackson's views on the nervous processes concomitant with faint images and with 'ideas of movements' are of the utmost importance in a consideration of the nature of the substrate of mentation. Thinking involves, one might say, the ' interplay ' of faint images and ' ideas of movements.' Suppose today I am thinking of something I saw yesterday, e.g. an automobile accident. I visualize the scene, the paths of the automobiles, the collision, and I recall the sound of the crash and the cries of the injured. All these images that come to my mind are faint images. At the same time I have in my mind a series of unuttered verbal propositions describing the occurrence: 'The two cars met at the corner, one travelling east, the other north. They were going fast and collided with a loud crash,' etc. Since I am only thinking of the accident and not talking about it, these words remain unspoken. During silent thinking, then, one may infer activation of substrates of faint images and substrates of unspoken words. Since these substrates lie entirely in the highest centres, it may be said that the nervous processes concomitant with thinking are (with trifling exceptions which need not be gone into here) confined to the highest centres. In other words, during silent thinking the highest centres function independently of lower centres.
But the capacity of the highest centres to act independently of lower centres is a trait which makes its appearance only after the highest centres have reached a certain degree of maturity. In early childhood the highest centres are relatively incapable of acting independently. When a young child thinks, the activity of his highest centres is accompanied by activity of lower centres. Since thinking is concerned with imagery and with movement, there are two manifestations of this infantile condition of the highest centres.
(1) The child thinks in terms of vivid images, while the adult thinks in terms offaint images. (2) The child thinks in terms of actual movements, while the adult thinks in terms of' ideas of movements.' These manifestations will be considered separately.
1. Young Children Think in terms of Vivid, rather than Faint, Images. The evidence for this proposition was given in my recent paper 5 This evolution of the infantile mind is made possible by a corresponding evolution in the highest cerebral centres, which, from being dependent on lower centres, incapable of activation save when lower centres are being activated, become at length so independent that now they may be activated when lower centres are idle.
Jackson, years ago, expressed the same conclusion regarding the independence of the highest centres. He wrote (I, 375):
'As evolution progresses the highest centres not only gradually develop (become increasingly complex, etc.), but also become more and more detached from, and more independent of, the lower centres out of which they have been evolved. . . . There are degrees of detachment and of independence.. . . . (When independence has been attained) our highest sensory and highest motor centres (together the " organ of mind ") can energize, to a large degree, independently of the lower centres out of which they have been evolved, and by aid of which they have been developed; consequently they can act independently of the environment. ' Again, speaking of the hierarchy of nervous centres, he wrote (II, 477): 'The relations of these centres to one another is a very complex one. Besides relation of direction and control, the higher their evolution the more independent do centres become in their activity; there is quasi-detachment, so that in the' most " detached " (the highest) centres activities can go on (internal evolution) largely independent of present converse with the environment; on the psychical side there can arise trains of thought independent of present experiences. ' The degree of independence attained by the highest centres depends in part on their healthiness. The healthier they are, the more independence do they attain. It is therefore to be expected that in acquired disease of the highest centres there would (at least in some cases) be some degree of diminution of the independence previously attained. Mentation in these cases would be characterized by either or both of two infantile tendencies: (1) the tendency to think in terms of vivid rather than faint images; (2) the tendency to think vocally rather than silently. Cases illustrating these tendencies will now be cited. sufficiently healthy to be capable of independent activity. Now suppos3 the sailor happens to be in a delirium when he glances at the tattooed figure. The same train of thought will be evoked, but now it may be expressed in vivid images. The sailor may now have hallucinations of his sweethearthe may ' see ' and ' hear ' her.
In the foregoing (hypothetical) instance we know the stimulus which led to the hallucination; it was the sight of the tattooed figure. In most actual instances of hallucination the stimulus cannot be identified. Nevertheless these instances are open to the same explanation as the instance of the sailor. Believers in determinism will agree that each thought, or, more accurately, the cerebral process concomitant with each thought, is a reaction to the cerebral processes which existed a moment before. This principle holds even for those instances in which we cannot ascertain what thoughts (conscious or unconscious) immediately preceded the hallucination. I submit, then, that the following formulation, if valid at all, is of general validity. Supposing a series of cerebral processes leads to activation of the substrate of a particular idea, the form which this idea will take will depend on whether the highest centres are at the moment able to function independently of lower centres. If they are, there will be activation of highest centres only-activation of the substrates of certainfaint images: the subject will think of certain things. If they are not, there will be activation of highest centres and lower centres as well-activation of the substrates of vivid images; the subject will see, hear, or otherwise perceive these things.
In my earlier paper 5 I have discussed more fully the significance of hallucinations as manifestations of ' reduction to a more automatic condition.' I therefore pass on to the second manifestation of loss of independence of the highest centres.
2. The Abnormal Tendency to Think Vocally rather than Silently.-One of the popularly recognized symptoms of insanity is 'talking to oneself.' Everyone has observed some human derelict walking by on the street, muttering to himself. Here is a perfect instance of disease of the highest centres causing them to return to their infantile state. The demented patient, like the two-year-old child, says what he is thinking.
Some patients are painfully aware of this inability to think their thoughts without saying them. I 5 have mentioned the case of a woman who, in giving a retrospective account of a period of overtalkativeness following her emergence from a catatonic stupor, said, ' I had no speech control. It seemed as if I couldn't think things but could only say them. There was a great fear in my mind that I would never again be able to think without speaking, and I thought how horrible it would be to have to go through life that way.'
In the same paper I referred to Lindemann's 6 The following additional cases have come under my observation.
A young woman, after recovering from a manic excitement, gave a retrospective account, in which she said that her chief trouble had been with her ' head running away.' In explanation of this phrase she said, ' You can't keep quiet. You can't keep your own secrets. Things that happened years ago would come to my mind and I'd say them aloud. I'd give everything away I had; I couldn't keep quiet. ' It is possible that much, perhaps all, of the overtalkativeness of manic patients is a manifestation of inability to think without speaking. Manic patients say what healthy people merely think. I once walked through a ward accompanied by a very obese nurse. We met a manic woman who looked the nurse up and down and said contemptuously, ' My, how fat you are ! ' A healthy person in the same situation would have thought this proposition., not said it.
In the examples already given, the patient's thoughts were expressed in overt speech, so as to be audible to bystanders. In the next three examples the vocalization of the patient's thoughts did not reach this extreme degree.
A coal miner, age 31, entered the Harrisburg State Hospital suffering from schizophrenia. The two symptoms that will be mentioned here are hallucinations and a condition which he described with the adjective 'loudminded. ' The hallucinations were auditory and olfactory. The auditory hallucinations consisted of voices which said vile things about the patient. In loudness they varied from a whisper to the volume which would be employed by a man calling another man ten yards away. They sounded like natural human voices, so much so that he steadfastly believed people were talking about him.
The feature of the case which is important here is the 'loud-minded' condition. The patient first revealed this in giving an account of his illness, when he said, 'It all started when my brain got loud-minded.' (What does 'loud-minded ' mean ?) 'I mean, whatever I think, you can hear, without me saying it with my tongue.' (Can you hear it ?) ' Yes.' (Give an example.) 'Whatever I think, my voice-box goes like. I should think with my head, not with my voice-box.' (Give an example.) ' The other day I was wondering how my blood test was going to turn out, and I heard these words, " I wonder how my blood test is going to be." ' (Give another example.) ' I was thinking about getting parole here, and that got loud too: " Maybe they're going to parole me." My lips didn't say it, my voice-box said it. I think in my voice-box, and then it goes way up in my mind, and then it sounds just like-(gropes for the proper phrase)-transformed broadcasts.'
On another occasion he gave this description: ' If I was natural (i.e. healthy), when I think of something I'd think just a little bit. This way, I must think with my voice-box. I must talk it-but not with my tongue. It's all in my head.' Because his thoughts werc audible to himself and (he thought) to others, he spoke of them as 'loud thoughts.' They, however, were not loud in the ordinary sense: they were even quieter than a whisper. 'They don't sound like no voice: just like imagination. It's no voice. It just goes through me like-yet I can hear it.'
The patient drew a distinction between his 'loud thoughts' and his hallucinations ('voices '). The 'voices' impressed him as real: he thought people were actually making vile remarks about him. On the other hand, the 'loud thoughts,' he knew, arose in his own mind. Another difference is that the content of the ' voices ' was usually expressed in the third person, while that of the 'loud thoughts' was always in the first person.
This, then, is a case in which the patient's thoughts, while unspoken, were accompanied by laryngeal sensations so intense as to lead him to believe his thoughts were being vocalized. He heard them himself, and thought others heard them too, though at the same time he realized they lacked the quality of ordinary utterances.
A woman of 61, with signs of cerebral arteriosclerosis, entered a moderately severe depression, one of her symptoms being that 'I talk to myself.' In describing this she said, 'Everything I think I'm going to do I say to myself. (For example) I " say " to myself, " Now I'm going to go to bed." ' When out walking she 'talked' to herself about the things she observed. 'Almost everything I see I have to repeat.' For example, she ' said ' to herself, ' I see this ' ; ' That's a car.' Many of the thoughts which she ' said ' to herself were sensible: e.g. ' I don't know what to do '; ' I'm afraid.' On the other hand, some were strange and incomprehensible to her: e.g. ' I ask for punishment '; ' I refuse. ' This ' talking to herself ' always occurred with lips perfectly motionless, so that members of the family were never able to observe anything unusual. She herself heard everything she ' said ' to herself. It sounded like ' my own voice.' It was even quieter than a whisper. She knew that the phenomenon took place entirely in her mind.
A schizophrenic woman of 47 entered the Hospital, one of her complaints being that people 'seem to put thoughts in my head.' These thoughts she was compelled to 'repeat,' her lips being either shut or open and slightly in motion. Later, after much improvement, she said retrospectively, ' It seemed as though I had to repeat what they (hallucinatory voices) said. I repeated it in my mind, not with my lips-just like thinking it over.' The symptom had gone; as she said, ' I have more control.'
In the next two cases the patients did not think they were 'saying' or 'repeating' their thoughts, but mentation was accompanied by sensations referred to the organs of articulation.
A paranoid schizophrenic woman of 45 often heard a 'spirit' talking to her. She identified the spirit as Jesus. She said, ' When I hear the spirit talking, I feel it in my mouth and throat. My lips and tongue move.'
A schizophrenic man of 22 heard voices which he termed 'undertones' aand which, he said, came in through his nose. When asked why they came in through the nose ancd not the ears, he replied, ' Because vour mind is connected with your mouth '-a remarkable statement, considering the importance of speech (spoken and unspoken) in mentation.
Some of the foregoing cases show that there are degrees of loss of independence of the highest centres. To take but two instances: (1) the loss is great in those-cases in which the patient's thoughts are actually vocalized, so as to be audible to bystanders; (2) the loss is slighter in those cases in which the patient thinks he is vocalizing his thoughts when to bystanders they are inaudible.
Echolalia is a special maniifestation of loss of independence of the highest centres. One of the results of our saying ' tree ' to a person is that he 'thinks of ' the word; he has an ' idea of the word.' There is activation of the substrate of the unspoken word 'tree.' When the highest centres are insufficiently independent of lower centres, there will be activation of the substrate of the spoken word, with the consequence that on hearing the word 4 tree ' the patient will actually say it.
The same explanation applies to echopraxia. When A claps his hands in the presence of B, there are two consequences in B. (1) Examples will now be given to show the application of this general rule to the higher levels of the nervous system.
Becher 1 found that 'a large percentage of children, when told to opeii the mouth wide and put the tongue out, spread the fingers.' This is a forceful illustration of the occurrence of mass reflexes in the immature organism.
In the nervous system of the young child, the substrate for opening the mouth wide and that for opening the fingers wide are iladequately differentiated, so that the command to open the mouth wide activates both substrates. Thus a relatively large cerebral area is activated by a stimulus which, in the adult, would activate a small area.
I have observed the following incident in a bright healthy boy 35 weeks old. The child, not yet able to sit unsupported, was being held by his mother while she sat in a restaurant eating a plate of soup. The mother held the child on her knee, and ate the soup with her other hand. Each spoonful, onI its way to the mother's mouth, passed a few inches from the child's face. The child had had his own meal only two hours before, so that now he was not hungry. Nevertheless the odour of the, soup aroused an alimentary response. After several spoonfuls had passed before his gaze, each succeeding spoonful was observed to elicit a response in the form of tasting movements. He watched the path of the spoon from the plate to the mother's mouth, and as it passed the point nearest his own mouth he made five or six tasting movements. The significance of this observation becomes evident when one considers what the response of an adult in a similar situation would be. An adult, when his appetite is aroused, responds only with salivation; the infant responded with salivation (inferred, not observed) and tasting movements. In the infant's highest centres the area excited is larger than in the adult's. The infant's reflex, as compared with the adult's, is a mass reflex.
I now offer a similar observation in the case of a middle-aged man suffering from a fever delirium. The patient was in bed, wearing a hospital gown. When asked what time of day it was, he replied, 'I don't know-I haven't got my watch.' As he said this, he placed the fingers of his right hand into the right-hand pocket and then into the left-hand pocket of an imaginary waistcoat. A clear-headed man, if asked the same question while wearing a hospital gown, might have made the same verbal response, but no manual response. It may be objected that this example proves nothing, that the patient fumbled in his imaginary pockets merely because he was too confused to realize he was not wearing a waistcoat. This is a psychological explanation. Without going into the question of the merits and demerits of psychological explanations of behaviour, I say only that I am here trying to analyse the physiological substrates of certain examples of behaviour. A physiological inquiry must deal only with nervous substrates and their excitation and inhibition. Viewing the delirious man's response physiologically, we must say that there was excitation of the substrates of a verbal reflex and a manual reflex, and that, in the case of a clear-headed man under the same circumstances, the substrate of the verbal reflex only would have been activated.. The delirious man, therefore, showed, relatively speaking, a mass reflex.
I submit that the two symptoms discussed in the previous sectionhallucinations and loss of the ability to think silently-are instances of mass. reflexes. The substrate of a vivid image includes, and is therefore larger than, that of a faint image. When a psychotic man reacts with a hallucination (a vivid image) to a stimulus which in a healthy man would produce only an idea or a representation (a faint image), we may infer, in the psychotic man, excitation of a relatively wide cerebral area; in the healthy man, excitation of a relatively narrow area. Similarly, in the case of patients who must speak their thoughts, there is excitation of a relatively wide cerebral area (the substrate of a spoken word being larger than that of an unspoken word).
Summarizing the data contained in this section, it may be said that the primitive nervous system is characterized by the relative predominance of mass reflexes-diffuse responses involving large parts of the nervous system. As the nervous system evolves, its parts become more and more complex, and more and more capable of acting alone, thus permitting responses involving smaller and smaller cerebral areas. When the nervous system is diseased, there may be a return to the more primitive condition, with the reappearance of mass reflexes.
AUTOMATIC REASONING Automatic reasoning is illustrated by two examples. (1) Suppose one is. asked to solve this problem in arithmetic: if two men can build iwo boats in two days, then one man can build one boat in how many days ? Stupid persons will say that the answer is obviously one day. This is an automatic response; it is 'the first thing that comes to one's mind.' Only a person who has passed a certain point in cerebral evolution is capable of discerning its incorrectness. Many of the beliefs of the vast majority of mankind are automatic beliefs-beliefs implanted by suggestion and maintained in the face of conspicuous lack of proof. For example, a woman spoke in glowing terms of a book of reminiscences by an astrologer who claimed he had foretold the date of many events, including the death of King Edward VII. She marvelled at this ability and said that until she read this book she had been unaware of the value of astrology. Her obviously sincere, and not ironic, manner showed that she had accepted uncritically the astrologer's statement of his achieve-ments. In so doing she had reacted automatically in a situation which, in a more highly evolved person, would have evoked a more complex and more critical response.
An instance of an automatic response to suggestion in delirium will now be given. The patient, age 63, had a delirium associated with myocardiar failure. In testing his orientation, I asked him to tell me the time. He pondered several seconds. Then, as it happened, the ward telephone gave two sharp rings. As soon as he heard them, he replied, 'That says two-I think it's later than that-I'd say it's about 3 o'clock-maybe 2.30.' (Actually it was 10.30 a.m.) The two rings had produced in him the mental state 'two,' whereupon uncritically he had accepted it as relevant to the topic of his cogitation. In a person with intact highest centres this mental state would have been promptly suppressed as irrelevant.
The lesson of these examples is plain. There are primitive and complex modes of reasoning. The former are acquired early in life, the latter late. The former occur during activation of lower layers of the highest centres, the latter during activation of higher layers. When the highest centres are incompletely evolved (as in children and in unintelligent and immature adults), or when disease (by interrupting the highest layers) reduces them to a lower level of evolution, there is 'reduction to a more automatic condition,'' manifesting itself in relative predominance of primitive modes of reasoning.
MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES OF AUTOMATIC ACTION 1. The more one practises an act, the more automatic it becomes. To the greeting ' Good morning ' one responds automatically ' Good morning '-automatically because one has done it so often. Sometimes circumstances arise which call for a response different from the habitual. In these circumstances the ability to break away from the habitual response is a measureof the evolution of the highest centres.
Children whom I examine address me sometimes with the polite forms reserved for women: they say ' Yes, ma'am ' and ' No, ma'am.' Those who do this are usually below the average in intelligence, and usually come from poor homes. The reason for this behaviour is that children of poor familiesare accustomed to speak politely only to their school teachers (usually women). They rarely hear ' sir ' and ' ma'am ' at home and rarely are taught to use them, except at school. At school, when the teacher is a woman, ' ma'am ' is used to the exclusion of ' sir.' In this way they acquire the 'ma am ' habit. Sometimes a child, after saying ' ma'am ' to me, becomes embarrassed, having recognized his blunder, in spite of which-so hard is it to break the habit-he continues to address me in the same way.
The force of habit is seen in the case of those demented senile patients who give the year as 18 hundred and something. Taking an actual case, a patient of 75, seen in 1935, gave the year as 1835. This error indicates.
*the predominance of a more automatic over a less automatic response. Until the age of 40 the patient lived in the nineteenth century, and it was habitual with him to think of the year as 18 something. After the turn of the century it became habitual to think of the year as 19 something. The habit of mature years is less automatic, less stable, than that of childhood; it is the more easily lost-just as a language learned in later years is easier to forget than that learned in childhood. Accordingly, when the highest layers of the highest centres are diseased, there is loss of the more complex habit (19 something) and reappearance of the more automatic habit (18 something). There is a tendency to think that the errors of senile patients are haphazard. This is not entirely true. Errors in the last two digits of the year are sometimes seemingly haphazard, but errors in the second digit are always (in my experience) traceable to the strength of the habit laid down in childhood. When the patient errs in the century he always says it is 18 something. I have never heard a patient give the year as 17 something, because I have never had one who passed his childhood in the eighteenth century. For a similar reason I have never heard a patient give the year as 20 something. I think it probable that the senile patients of 100 years ago often made the mistake of thinking it was 1735, but never (or rarely) 1935. I also think it -probable that the senile patients of 1890 never erred in the century; if this is -true, it is because they never knew a time when it was not 18 hundred and something.
2. The untidiness of demented patients is automatic. In infants *distention of bladder and. rectum is followed promptly by evacuation. In older persons this response is suppressed save under special circumstances. Perhaps it will be said that the demented patient's untidiness needs no physiological explanation, that a psychological explanation is enough, viz. -the patient is apathetic, and lacks the will to go to the toilet. But this is really no explanation; it is only another way of saying he is untidy. On the other hand, it is, I think, an explanation to say he is untidy because of impairment of those higher pathways which normally inhibit the primitive evacuation reflexes.
3. Some psychotic patients are easily irritated and respond belligerently with undue haste. An epileptic under my observation was sitting at his meal in the ward dining-room. To keep flies away from his glass of milk, he had laid a slice of bread on top of the glass. A fellow-patient came up from behind to borrow the sugar. In reaching for it he accidentally dislodged the bread from the epileptic's glass. Without pausing to ascertain the circumstances, the epileptic wheeled about savagely and for a; moment seemed about -to strike the other man. Such behaviour is automatic.
